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The Xinjiang Class: Multi-ethnic Encounters and the Spaces of Prescription 
and Negotiation in an Eastern Coastal City 
 




The Xinjiang Class (Xinjiang neidi ban, or Xinjiangban) has far-reaching implications for Beijing’s 
governance of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. Existing literature has focused primarily on the Uyghur–
Han dichotomy, with limited attention being paid to the actual multi-ethnic interactions that constitute 
the situated dynamics of policy implementation. Utilizing the notions of the space of prescription and 
the space of negotiation to develop an analytical framework, this paper argues that social relations in the 
Xinjiangban are ongoing constructions borne by everyday experiences of domination and negotiation, 
and that space is constitutive of this situated dynamic. Based on nearly four years of research at a 
Xinjiangban, we make a case for the fluidity and incoherence of the implementation of the Xinjiangban 
policy. Those who implement it at the school level produce a space of prescription that deploys specific 
spatial–temporal arrangements to manage expressions of ethnic identity. Driven by the need to achieve 
upward mobility, minority students are open-minded about the Han- and patriotism-centred education. 
However, they use innovative and improvised tactics to create spaces of negotiation to re-assert their 
ethnicities. In Xinjiangban, minority students do comply with spaces of prescription, but they 
simultaneously keep their ethnic and religious practices alive. 
 
Keywords: Xinjiang Inland Class (Xinjiang neidi ban); Uyghur; ethnic integration; ethnic minority 




Beijing’s Long-Term Educational Strategies in Xinjiang 
Muslim minorities in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, especially the Uyghurs, 
have received increasing attention from scholars because they are “one of the most politically 
sensitive minorities among which there exists a strong aspiration for independence from 
China.”1 Over the past decade or so, driven by the rising demand for skilled labour under the 
“open up the west” development programme (xibu dakaifa 西部大开发) as well as the 
heightened sensitivity over issues of social stability and security in Xinjiang, the Chinese 
government has begun to rethink its ethnic integration strategies and devise cultural and 
educational policies to ease inter-ethnic tensions. 2  In 2000, the government launched a 
boarding school project aimed at ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, termed the Neidi Xinjiang 
gaozhong ban 内地新疆高中班hereafter, Xinjiangban 新疆班). The project is the brainchild 
of the Ministry of Education (MOE), and its primary motive is to provide high-achieving 
junior secondary school graduates in Xinjiang, mostly Uyghurs, with access to senior 
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secondary schools (gaozhong 高中 ) in predominately Han cities in China. Unlike the 
infamous nation-building experiments with boarding schools for indigenous people in 
Australia, Canada and the United States, the Xinjiangban programme appears to be gaining in 
popularity.3 Over the past 15 years, the Xinjiangban network has spread to encompass 93 
schools cross 45 inland cities. In 2015, there were more than 34,000 incumbent pupils and 
nearly 43,000 graduates. As Yangbin Chen points out, the policy has far-reaching 
implications for Uyghur–Han inter-ethnic relations in China.4  
The significant development of the Xinjiangban has attracted the attention of both 
domestic and international scholars. Not surprisingly, most research produced in domestic 
China simply reproduces state propaganda and contends that the policy is rational and 
legitimate.5 Arguing to the contrary, a limited but growing number of studies published in 
English have reviewed the policy from the angle of students’ experiences. Chen examines a 
Xinjiangban in terms of social capital, arguing that Uyghur students play active roles in 
negotiating the agenda of ethnic integration designed by the state. 6  Timothy Grose has 
conducted a study on language use and the future plans of college students who have 
graduated from the Xinjiangban; he suggests that the Xinjiangban fails to enhance ethnic 
unity.7 From a different perspective but in a comparable gist, Chen argues that interactions 
between Uyghur students and local Han students give rise to negative stereotypes and 
feelings.8 More recently, Chen has attempted to unpack the diversity among Uyghur youth, 
which has evidenced intra-ethnic discrimination among Uyghur students in universities.9 
Moreover, Grose takes note of the revival of Islamic identity among Uyghur students during 
their university years and argues that, in contrast to the expectation of the state, the 
Xinjiangban is not capable of weakening students’ religious identity.10 
Although the number of studies on the Xinjiangban is increasing, the current research, 
both in Chinese and English, largely focuses on the interplays between the institutionalized 
authority of state agenda and the responses of Uyghur students. However, interactions 
between Uyghur students, teachers, local Han students and other ethnic minority students are 
understudied. Moreover, the English scholarship tends to regard the policy as seamless, given 
and static, while ignoring the dynamics of the ongoing reproduction and reinvention of the 
policy within China’s social and political hierarchies. This has resulted in a dearth of studies 
on the dynamics of policy implementation across various levels of government. There has 
also been insufficient attention paid to the spatial dimension of the Xinjiangban. This paper, 
however, argues for the importance of spatial implications. The school is a space where 
multicultural encounters occur. School spaces are not passive containers of everyday routines 
and interactions. The specific spatial–temporal configurations of the schools are actually 
intended to enact the norms and rules inherent to the policy. This paper argues that space 
shapes the everyday politics of Xinjiangban and plays an active role in structuring and 
conditioning multi-ethnic interactions. 
Building on the ideas of “space of prescription” and “space of negotiation,” adopted 
from Jonathan Murdoch’s work, this paper attempts to elaborate the local ecology of the 
Xinjiangban. We first examine the interpretation and implementation of the policy across 
China’s political hierarchy, which spans from the central to the local. We continue by 
exploring how school spaces are constructed as spaces of prescription, where dominant 
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norms and rules are recurrently reiterated, reinstituted and re-asserted. Finally, the paper 
investigates Xinjiang students’ response to the prescriptions. We place a specific emphasis on 
the space–time strategies that Xinjiang students utilize to navigate and negotiate the dominant 
prescriptions. 
 
Space and the Politics of Prescription and Negotiation 
The sociological knowledge on social capital and social networks has been a source of 
theoretical inspiration for the study of Xinjiangban. In his widely cited work, Chen introduces 
the concept of bonding social capital to examine the way in which Uyghur identity is 
reconstructed and reinforced in everyday schooling. 11  However, a few areas worthy of 
interest have been overlooked in the existing studies of Xinjiangban. First, the analyses tend 
to take structural factors such as political hierarchy and power configuration as pre-existing 
and static. Yet, the Xinjiangban policy is not carried out locally in coherent and consistent 
ways, and thus should be re-measured in terms of its actual implementation at various levels 
of government. Second, the Uyghur–Han dichotomy has dominated this line of inquiry, and 
few studies have discussed the local dynamics of Xinjiangban with foci not only on Han and 
Uyghur but also on other ethnic minorities involved. Third, space, which has long been 
regarded as a passive setting for social life and interactions, is now understood by social 
scientists to be an active medium of social (re)production.12 For instance, in his reading of the 
dialectics of time, space and being, Edward Soja argues that the production of spatiality, in 
conjunction with the making of history, can be described as both the medium and the 
outcome, the presupposition and the embodiment, of social relationships.13 Spatiality – that is, 
the constellation of material and contextual conditions whose changes are embedded in social 
processes – is integral to the interrogation of social life.14 Within the sociology of education, 
where the bulk of the literature on Xinjiangban is anchored, Susan Robertson has argued for 
the necessity of “spatializing” the sociological research of education.15 Although there has 
been critical thinking about space among sociologists, and, as mentioned above, Xinjiangban 
has distinctive spatial implications, there has to date been no systematic research done on the 
implementation of the policy with an explicit spatial reference. 
 Given the importance conferred to spatiality in this study, the article engages with 
Jonathan Murdoch’s thesis of space that draws from the actor–network theory (hereafter, 
ANT) to offer the conceptualizations of spaces of prescription and spaces of negotiation.16 
Ontologically, the ANT sees agency lying with multiple human and non-human elements and 
explores the ways in which heterogeneous elements are enrolled and assembled in a 
network. 17  Murdoch goes on to argue that a network can be understood in terms of 
translation – the processes of negotiation, representation and displacement across actors, 
entities and spaces within a network, from which politics emerges.18 In this vein, the space of 
prescription refers to the network where translations are perfectly accomplished. In spaces of 
prescription, entities have a predilection to conform to specific rules, norms and codes laid 
down by centrally placed actors. In this study, the space of prescription is where the dominant 
ideas and discourses of ethnicity are institutionalized and concretized by variegated practices 
of policy implementation. Spaces of negotiation, in contrast, are sites of “alternative ordering,” 
where resistance, uncertainty and unpredictable ideas and behaviour are made possible by 
less empowered actors.19 Even the most formalized and regulated space of prescription is 
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open to negotiation, which means that the boundary between the space of prescription and 
negotiation is fluid rather than rigid.20 
  In the case of Xinjiangban, prescription is tantamount to processes in which policy 
implementers seek to shape and define the dispositions and behaviour of policy recipients.21 
Policy implementers are principally those in charge of the implementation of the Xinjiangban 
policy at local levels, including officials from the municipal government, school 
administrators and teachers. Policy recipients are those who are at the receiving end of the 
policy, primarily Xinjiang students, but also local Han students. Negotiation is the process by 
which policy recipients comply with, negotiate, and in some cases, subvert the prescriptions 
enacted by policy implementers.  
 Prescription and negotiation are means to act within a space. Tara Fenwick and 
Richard Edwards reflect on the relationship between space and the ANT, arguing that 
educational spaces can be understood in terms of a multiplicity of entities and the multiple 
networks of relations emerging amidst them. Space is enlivened by not only humans but also 
by non-human entities.22 Drawing from Fenwick and Edwards, we argue that all entities that 
add to and construct the experiences of everyday schooling, including administrators, 
teachers, students, desks, textbooks, propaganda banners, spatial arrangements in the 
classroom and even the layout of the campus, are exercising agency in one way or another 
and remake educational spaces with specific meanings.23 
 Based on this framework, this study attempts to elaborate on the politics of 
prescription and negotiation among various actors within the network of state education 
programmes. Specifically, we probe into the capabilities of policy implementers and 
recipients in arranging and structuring spaces and practices in everyday schooling. The 
space–time contingencies in a local Xinjiangban are teased out to examine the dialectics 
between spaces of prescription and negotiation. Notably, we not only examine the interplays 
of state education and the agency of Uyghur students, as most existing studies have done, but 
we also take into account the multiple relations among Uyghur, Han and other ethnic groups 
in the Xinjiangban. 
 
Research Methods 
The accessibility of Xinjiangban schools has long been a limitation for researchers. Until now, 
Chen has been the only author to carry out an in-depth ethnography of a Xinjiangban. Grose 
collected data from university students who had graduated from the programme. The majority 
of existing studies, however, are based on second-hand data. Our paper is based on nearly 
four years of follow-up study of a Xinjiangban. One of the authors (hereafter, the researcher) 
has been a teaching assistant in a Xinjiangban since 2012. The school in our study is located 
in one of the richest cities in southern China and is known for its high performance in the 
public educational system. It hosts around 600 Xinjiangban students and more than 2,000 
local Han students. Unlike the Xinjiangban students in Chen’s studies, who were isolated 
from local students, the Xinjiangban students attending the studied school undergo a one-year 
preparatory class and then enrol on a three-year standard programme in ethnically mixed 
classes with local Han students, making multicultural encounters an everyday norm. It is 
worth noting that this policy of mixing Xinjiang students and local Han students together in 
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one class has gradually been adopted nationwide with the aim of enhancing inter-ethnic 
interactions. 
By participating in the teaching and management of the Xinjiangban, the researcher 
was able to make close and detailed observations. Conversing in the Uyghur language with 
Xinjiang students helped him to establish a rapport and build mutual trust with students. 
Apart from participant observation, the data shown in this paper also draw from 32 in-depth 
interviews and six focus group discussions involving Xinjiang students, teachers and school 
administrators between 2012 and 2014. In line with the campus rules on language, all 
interviews were conducted in Mandarin.  
Consideration has been given to the balance of the socio-demographic profiles of the 
informants. In terms of ethnicity, Uyghur students account for more than 70 per cent of the 
Xinjiang students and Kazakh students account for 15 per cent; other ethnic groups such as 
Han, Hui, Kyrgyz and Tajik make up the remaining 15 per cent. Although the Uyghurs are the 
majority group in the Xinjiangban, this paper also presents the views and practices of other 
minority students, including Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Hui, among others.24 The ratio of male to 
female informants is 60 per cent to 40 per cent, which reflects the gender ratio of the studied 
Xinjiangban. Because the researcher is male, information about what female students did in 
dormitories was gathered exclusively through interviews instead of observation. All names, 
including those of the school and the informants, are either anonymized or presented as 
pseudonyms. 
In addition, the researcher collected all relevant policy documents (including various 
opinions, regulations and by-laws instituted by various political entities), and teaching 
materials such as textbooks, students’ weekly ideological reports, teachers’ working logs, and 
so forth. Furthermore, the researcher paid specific attention to the spatial settings of the 
school, aiming to unpack the constitutive role of space in the everyday politics of the 
Xinjiangban. 
 
Cultivating Loyal Subjects: Translation of Norms and the Construction of the Space of 
Prescription in Xinjiangban 
From central to local: the production of the dominant norms in Xinjiangban 
 
As Murdoch argues, spaces of prescription are capable of persuading entities to behave in 
line with the norms and scripts inscribed and defined by those with centralized authority.25 
For the Xinjiangban, there is no doubt that the deployment of all resources, including 
teaching materials, finance and personnel, is arranged according to the policy implementers’ 
interpretation of the prescriptions of the policies. In this section, we investigate the ways in 
which policy implementers mobilize symbolic and material resources in implementing and 
concretizing the policy. 
According to the numerous notices and instructions issued by the central government, 
the Xinjiangban aims not only to cultivate a group of professionals who can serve the “open 
up the west” development programme but also to educate qualified patriots to distance 
themselves from separatist and religious extremist elements in Xinjiang. Very few detailed 
instructions on the methods of implementation have been given though, apart from the 
mandate that “all Xinjiangban students, regardless of ethnicity, are mixed together and taught 
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in Chinese.” From the outset, gaining modern professional skills and know-how and 
developing patriotism have become the key “prescriptions” superimposed on the students 
participating in the programme. Evidently, Xinjiangban policy prioritizes ethnic integration 
by mixing various ethnicities in the school.  
During the process of implementation, the management of expressions of ethnicity is 
essential to the making of prescriptions at the local level. Since the provinces and 
municipalities receiving Xinjiang students are not located in areas with concentrated ethnic 
minority populations, there is little local experience of dealing with ethnic issues. The 
Xinjiangban programme is a top–down assignment from the central government, which local 
political entities are forced to translate and respond to. In the province where our research 
was conducted, there are two provincial-level policies and one municipal-level policy devised 
for localization. The provincial policies reproduce the political rhetoric of the central 
government, stating that the Xinjiangban programme is a “glorious and important political 
task.” However, unlike the provincial-level translation, the “action plan” issued by the 
municipal government interprets the Xinjiangban as a “glorious but arduous political task” 
(emphasis added). As the policy implementer working at the coalface, the municipal 
government has to deal with the challenges of assembling financial resources, personnel, 
spaces, etc., in order to turn the policies into reality. According to the action plan, it is 
essential to “keep in mind that ethnicity and religion are non-trivial issues. And we need to 
hold strong political sensitivity in this matter.” In this sense, local policy implementers tend 
to highlight political sensitiveness and pressure. Consequently, policy implementers work 
prudently to avoid any political risk. The policy was localized by a work team led by the 
deputy mayor – the high-profile leadership was intended to ensure the effectiveness of 
implementation.  
As the MOE does not specify how to manage the Xinjiangban on a daily basis, the 
policy leaves space for implementers to address issues in their own ways.26 The principal of 
the studied school, also a key figure in the work team, interpreted the central tenet of the 
policy to be “to change the inherent ethnic and religious ideas in students’ minds.”27 When 
considering the relationship between ethnic identity and the aim of cultivating “successors of 
socialism” (shehuizhuyi jiebanren 社会主义接班人), the principal asserted that “if a student 
has a strong feeling of his/her ethnicity, he/she must be inclined to his/her ethnic and 
religious groups. However, a successor of socialism must be a citizen who places his/her 
nation at the first place.”28 In this vein, to transform ethnic minority students into adherents 
of the state, rather than those who prioritize their affinities to ethnicity and religion, has 
become the foremost task for the school. As one school administrator suggested, 
 
For Xinjiangban students, ideological education takes precedence. Their safety comes second, and study comes 
last. The reason that the government has paid such a large amount of money to fund them is to foster citizens 
who are thankful to the CCP (Dui (gongchan) Dang xincun ganen, 对（共产）党心存感恩).29 
 
Consequently, highlighting students’ national identity and downplaying the ethnic dimension 
of their self-identity have become the dominant prescriptions of schooling at the local level. 
In the following sections, we discuss how various entities, human and non-human alike, 
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contribute to the construction of spaces of prescription in the cultural politics of the 
Xinjiangban. 
 
Curricula, textbooks and everyday schooling 
 
Curricula, the key resource when reproducing the prescriptions set down by policies, are at 
the heart of schooling. The dissemination of national culture, as noted by He Baogang, is 
closely associated with the spread of Han scripts (hanzi 汉字). 30  In the context of the 
Xinjiangban, Fei Yan and Geoff Whitty argue that Han scripts and Mandarin Chinese have 
been prioritized within its curricula.31 In the compulsory education that spans four years, 
subjects such as Chinese, history, geography and politics are highlighted as important 
vehicles through which to perpetuate the perception of the “backwardness” of minorities and, 
simultaneously, the “modernity” of the country’s heartland. For example, history textbooks 
use derisory terms like “barbarians” (manyi 蛮夷 ) to represent minorities’ ancestors. 
Moreover, political subjects prioritize the evangelizing of not only communist ideologies but 
also, more importantly, patriotism. Great emphasis is placed on the achievements and the 
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Moreover, atheism and Marxist dialectical 
materialism are upheld as the orthodoxies that a patriot should follow. This, of course, 
contradicts and upsets the Islamic identity of Muslim students. Resonating with Grose, 
patriotic education takes precedence over all other educational goals in the Xinjiangban.32 
Even more, according to the Semester Schedule of 2012–2013, an extra “hidden curriculum” 
was embedded within patriotic education. During a semester that lasted nearly five months, 
there were four general meetings and one lecture on ideological and patriotic education. In 
addition, a “to-be-a-patriot” class meeting was held in the middle of the semester; a patriotic 
song competition was arranged for Youth Day (4th May); and it was compulsory to watch 
China Central Television’s daily news broadcasts. Through participating in such mundane 
daily activities, the students develop the discipline to practice and display political conformity, 
thereby allowing the state to govern through daily participation.  
Teachers are key actors who interpret and implement the policy in the everyday 
schooling of their pupils. As most teachers in the Xinjiangban are Han and few have had 
experience in teaching ethnic minority students, they tend to see students’ ethnicities and 
religious affinities as contradictory to ethnic unity. In an interview, a school administrator 
remarked, 
 
The programme is to separate them [Uyghur students] from the influences of religion and ethnic bonding, 
which go against our ethnic unity. 
 
The researcher: Do you think Uyghur ethnicity contradicts ethnic unity? 
 
I don’t know, but the terrors in Xinjiang are caused by the Uyghur Muslims, so I think that their ethnicity and 
Islamic belief does have something to do with the terrorism in China33 
 
To some extent, the educators adhere to the seemingly pervasive stereotypes of Uyghurs and 
Muslims in China as dangerous trouble makers and separatists. 34  In this sense, the 
translations of dominant norms in school are profoundly shaped by the broader social 
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context, transcending the spatial boundaries of the school. Consequently, most educators 
willingly align themselves with the state agenda of managing ethnic attachments and 
transforming minority students into loyal subjects. 
 
Temporal–spatial arrangements of the school 
 
In order to minimize inter-ethnic conflicts, the municipal government built an independent 
campus for the Xinjiangban. This gated campus is located beside the local Han students’ 
campus (hereafter, Han campus). All facilities, such as classrooms, dormitories and sport 
grounds, follow the same design as those on the Han campus, except for the Halal canteen. 
Not surprisingly, there is little representation of any Xinjiang culture within the landscape 
design of the Xinjiangban campus. Instead, the blackboards on the walls of the campus bear 
signs of propaganda of ethnic unity and patriotism. While there is an independent space for 
the Xinjiang students, students need to take classes on the Han campus with local Han 
students. In contrast, local students are not permitted to enter the Xinjiangban campus. All 
Xinjiangban students’ activities are confined within the campus. Hence, the gated campus is a 
carefully designed and coded space with strict boundary management being deployed to 
concretize the translations of the policy at local level.  
As with the spatial arrangements, management of the students themselves is military 
like. A highly organized space–time schedule has been enforced to structure the everyday life 
of students (see Table 1). According to both students and teachers, student life on campus is 
closely controlled and monitored. Xinjiangban students are housed separately in two 
dormitory buildings. The Uyghur students are split up from each other intentionally and are 
mixed with other ethnic minority students like Russians, Mongols and Kazakhs. This 
prevents the Uyghur students from forming associations and obstructs the formation of 
ethnicity-based social ties. Meanwhile, the dorm supervisors, ethnic Uyghurs dispatched by 
the Department of Education in Xinjiang, live in the same buildings as the Xinjiangban 
students, providing guidance and keeping everyday surveillance. 
 
Table 1: Temporal–Spatial Schedule of the Xinjiangban in Studied School 
 
Time Activities Spaces 
6:30 Get up, morning exercise, 
breakfast 
Xinjiang campus: dormitory, sports 
ground, Halal canteen 
7:20–7:45 Morning reading class Academic campus: classroom 
7:50–12:00 Five classes Academic campus: classroom, corridor 
and other public spaces 
12:00–12:50 Lunch time Xinjiang campus: Halal canteen; 
students’ seats pre-arranged. 
12:50–14:00 Noon break Xinjiang campus: dormitory 
14:20–16:45 Three classes Academic campus: classroom, corridor 
and other public spaces 
17:15–18:15 After class and dinner time Travel between Xinjiang campus and 
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the academic campus 
19:00–19:30 Watching the China Central 
Television’s daily news 
broadcast 
Academic campus: classroom, corridor 
and other public spaces 
19:30–22:00 Three night self-study 
classes 
Academic campus: classroom, corridor 
and other public spaces 
22:20 Rest time Xinjiang campus: dormitory 
 
As shown by their daily schedule, the routines followed by the Xinjiang students and the 
spaces they move through are highly regulated. The daily schedule has been designed to 
leave no time–space affordances for students to do things which are regarded as controversial 
to the prescriptions of the Xinjiangban education. For example, all students are required to 
get up at 6:30 am; yet, in order not to give Muslim students chances to do morning worship, 
school forbids students to get up any earlier than 6:30 am. Special means of control are 
employed in dormitories to keep a check on students. Abu, a male Uyghur in grade one, 
recalled his experience in a sudden dormitory check: 
 
The principal led a team to my dormitory. They said they had come for “prohibited items.” At that moment, I 
thought the “prohibited items” should be dangerous things like a knife. However, they tore down a poster 
which depicted a scene of a Uyghur community. Moreover, a calligraphy in the Uyghur language was also 
removed. They contended that actions were taken to keep dormitories tidy and a ‘standard’ look.35 
 
From Abu’s experience, it appears that the school administrators view items coded 
with ethnic culture as conflictual with school regulations. According to the “Rules for 
Xinjiang Students,” a copy of which was pinned to a wall in the Xinjiangban campus, any 
outward appearance of ethnicity and Islamic belief, such as a beard or a headscarf, is strictly 
prohibited. Furthermore, the only relief students are afforded from the confinements of the 
campus is on weekend shopping trips, which are for two hours only, once a month. During 
this outing, Xinjiangban students, accompanied by a teacher, board a school bus and head for 
a linear-shaped commercial pedestrianized street, deliberately selected so that surveillance 
can be conducted more easily. In sum, we argue that a space of prescription has been 
established in the Xinjiangban based on the mantra of patriotism, ethnic integration and 
subtle management of students’ ethnicities. Heterogeneous entities, including policies, 
teachers, spatial–temporal arrangements, etc. are assembled to serve a dominant pedagogy. In 
the next section, we look at the responses of various actors and how they negotiate this space 
of prescription. 
 
Constructing Spaces of Negotiation in Response to the Dominant Prescriptions 
Compliance as negotiation: aspirations for upward mobility 
 
In this section, we will explore the construction of spaces of negotiation in the Xinjiangban. 
As Murdoch argues, the space of prescription is never complete, but always open to 
negotiation.36 Spaces are constructed as a result of complex interactions between ordering, 
de-ordering and re-ordering. Likewise, Xinjiang students are active in negotiating and even 
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resisting dominant prescriptions through their everyday practices. Specifically, we examine 
the interactions between Uyghur students and other actors (in this case, Han teachers, local 
Han students and other ethnic minority students in the Xinjiangban), and the space–time 
contingencies in which the interaction occurs.  
Spaces of negotiation are constructed as alternate translations to dominant 
prescriptions. In the case of the Xinjiangban, we find that Xinjiangban students are inclined 
to interpret the policy in favour of individual career expectations and ethnic identity, rather 
than prioritizing the dominant prescriptions that reinforce state rationalities. They negotiate 
the policy in tune with three concerns: achieving upward social mobility, preserving ethnic 
culture and defending Islamic identity. 
 
Space: a classroom on the Han campus 
Time: a Chinese class 
Today, I sit in Class 10, grade two, to join a Chinese class. The teacher taught ancient Chinese prose, which is 
one of the most challenging subjects for Xinjiangban students. What surprises me is all five Xinjiangban 
students in this class were active in raising and answering questions … The Chinese teacher asked, “How many 
ancient writings could represent the meaning of demotion?” A Xinjiangban student raised his hand immediately 
to win the chance to answer. Although this student spoke broken Chinese and did not give a perfect answer, the 
teacher and other Han students still listened patiently and applauded him (Field notes, March 2013). 
 
Contrary to the intuitive view that minority students hold negative feelings towards state-led 
education in the Xinjiangban,37 we find that most ethnic minority students have open-minded 
attitudes not only to the imparting of knowledge indifferent to ethnic differences, but also the 
rhetoric of patriotism and ethnic integration. Almost all interviewed Xinjiangban students 
recognized the significance of learning Chinese. In her weekly report, a female Uyghur 
student in grade one wrote, “this week, I took the first monthly exam. My Chinese is poor, so 
I really struggled in a writing test. The good news is that my Chinese is improving since I 
made friend with Wang Ying [a local Han student]. While talking with her, I force myself to 
speak Chinese. In this way, I can make progress.” The Xinjiang students have largely 
internalized the state discourse claiming that Han society is open and modern, eastern cities 
are more prosperous, and Xinjiang is blocked and backward. This has actually given rise to a 
motive to maximize the utility of the education they receive on a daily basis. A Han student 
from Xinjiang wrote in his weekly report that “as a Han, I feel happy that my ethnic minority 
roommates could accept the Spring Festival. I thought they would keep a distance from this 
festival because of their religious and ethnic culture. But the reality is that they actively 
participated in making dumplings and other activities. Surprisingly, the New Year Scrolls 
(chunlian 春联) in our dormitory were bought by my Uyghur roommates.”  
The students’ recollections of their original intentions when enrolling in the Xinjiangban 
help us to understand the quiescent conformity to prescriptions. In response to the question, 
“why did you choose to study in the Xinjiangban?”, the most common answer was that the 
Xinjiangban provides better facilities, more qualified teachers and better chances for a 
successful career in the future. According to a questionnaire survey of 150 Xinjiangban 
students conducted by the authors in 2012, more than 75.5 per cent of the Xinjiangban 
students in the studied school came from rural areas; 56.7 per cent were children of farmers 
and herdsmen; and 71 per cent came from less wealthy families whose annual household 
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income was less than 10,000 yuan (US$1,516).38 A “gain–risk” calculation determines the 
ways that students negotiate the prescriptions.39 The calculation takes into consideration the 
benefits, which include having access to the alleged progressiveness of Han culture, gaining a 
competitive advantage in the market economy and landing a decent job, and the risks, which 
include the loss of labour for the household, separation from families and cultural 
communities, and fear of losing ethnic and religious identity. A female Uyghur student in a 
preparatory class confessed that, 
 
I come from a peasant family. My parents fall ill often. To reduce the burdens of supporting my education, I 
desired the opportunity to study in the Xinjiangban. Simultaneously, the Xinjiangban is good for my future. I 
came here bearing the hopes of my whole family.’40 
 
Removing students from their original communities and confining them within the 
campus are “spatial approaches” aimed at cultivating a labour force for the “open up the west” 
development programme and promoting inter-ethnic interactions. This kind of multi-ethnic 
encounter is a novel experience for many Xinjiangban students. Indeed, students in the 
Xinjiangban experience at first hand the cultural, economic and religious differences between 
the eastern coast and the west. Hence, many Xinjiangban students actually see the necessity 
of establishing social networks with Han Chinese. A female Kazakh student in grade two 
explained: 
 
Studying here [in the Xinjiangban] gives me a clear and direct recognition of the differences in regional 
economic progress. I think learning here can provide a great chance for us to socialize with Han people, 
knowing their culture, and ways of thinking and doing things. In this way, we can become middlemen 
connecting Xinjiang and the eastern provinces.41 
 
Moreover, students, who have undergone lessons in patriotism in primary and junior 
secondary schools, are not particularly fazed by the patriotism promoted by the Xinjiangban. 
Compared to their former experiences, some students even believe that the patriotic education 
in the Xinjiangban is more relaxed than the indoctrination they received in Xinjiang. A male 
Uyghur student in grade one stated that “we were obliged to too much patriotic education in 
Xinjiang. Sometimes, I even suspected that the primary goal of receiving education was to be 
patriotic. I think that patriotism is already in our minds. If schools pay too much attention to 
patriotism, we would feel stressed. Fortunately, the patriotic education here [in the 
Xinjiangban] is much milder than in Xinjiang.”42 The students’ relaxed attitude towards their 
lessons in patriotism is formed based on a comparison with the rigorous and pervasive 
pedagogies in Xinjiang. In this sense, even though patriotism is central to the rigid 
prescriptions in everyday schooling, for most Xinjiang students, it becomes acceptable.  
Furthermore, local Han students play positive roles in the Xinjiangban students’ 
adaptation to the spaces of prescriptions. Indeed, the exigency of ethnic integration is 
imposed not only on Xinjiangban students but also on local Han students. Local Han students 
in the school are also taught and expected to avoid ethnic conflict and to defend ethnic unity. 
In everyday inter-ethnic interactions, local Han students learn to be multicultural agents who 
understand their peers’ ethnic cultures and self-regulate their language, gesture, clothing and 
diet in the school to avoid conflict. We once observed a local Han student standing in the 
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locker room at the back of the classroom eating some fried noodles bought from a non-Halal 
canteen as breakfast. Out of respect for his Muslim classmates, he had chosen to eat his food 
in a discrete place and manner. Likewise, most Han students try to avoid using words like 
“pig” and “theft” in the classroom. Moreover, the self-discipline displayed by Han students is 
reflected in their physical behaviour. Local Han students tend to avoid close physical contact 
with their Muslim classmates – for example, not touching or approaching too closely when 
chatting, discussing or playing. 
It is not our intention to deny that boundaries persist between ethnic groups, but our 
field observations show that most local Han students are indeed familiarizing themselves 
with the cultures of ethnic minorities. This in turn contributes to Xinjiangban students’ 
positive attitudes to inter-ethnic interactions. A male Uyghur student in senior one explained 
that “honestly, I was never acquainted with Han students when studying in Xinjiang. But the 
experience [in the Xinjiangban] tells me that they [local Han students] are in fact nice and 
have higher suzhi 素质 (quality).”43 
However, this does not mean that Xinjiang students have taken the spaces of 
prescription as the sole basis for ordering their lifeworlds. Indeed, Xinjiangban students 
invent alternative prescriptions that emphasize both the development of personal careers and 
the preservation of ethnic identity. The Xinjiangban students have access to an attractive 
package of welfare and subsidies. This is an economic incentive to submit themselves to the 
dominant prescriptions mentioned above. However, ethnic minority students do counteract 
the rationales of the state. As a countermove to the state agenda of downplaying ethnicity, the 
ethnic identities of minority students are in fact being reinforced. The students’ struggle with 
the spaces of prescription is premised on a strong sense of their ethnic culture being at risk 
and their heightened cultural awareness. In a focus group with eight Uyghur students 
conducted in June 2012, we raised the question, “what do you want to say to Uyghur 
students?” Without hesitation, a female Uyghur student answered: “Please don’t forget our 
ethnic culture!” Similar expressions, such as “we should learn and develop our ethnic 
culture” and “we must keep intact our ethnic identity,” are also reflective of shared 
aspirations among the Uyghur and other ethnic groups. Within the state education, Uyghur 
students’ ethnic difference is spotlighted rather than suppressed. This is because, on a daily 
basis, they need to confront state discourses contrasting ethnic minorities with the Han 
Chinese who are promoted as the vanguards of modernity and development. This, ironically, 
leads to a deepened cultural self-awareness. A male Uyghur student in grade two admitted 
that: 
 
I cannot deny that this [attending the Xinjiangban class] is a good opportunity for us [to make success]. 
However, I am deeply concerned that this policy will lead us to forget our own culture. I am very anxious about 
the disappearance of our culture!44  
 
Stevan Harrell and Erzi Ma remind us that the minority group can tactically use education as 
a “mobility strategy”: they can preserve their ethnic identity and still opt into the school 
project attuned with dominant values. 45  By employing tactical self-discipline, minority 
students can pursue upward mobility and empower themselves in the social hierarchy via the 
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Xinjiangban. A male Uyghur student in senior two remarked that the social mobility of an 
individual Uyghur is in accordance with the needs and interests of the entire ethnic group: 
 
I force myself to study hard here, because I want to change the inferior and marginal status of the Uyghur by 
my own efforts. I want to be a senior official of education in the government in the future. Only in doing so can 
I use the political power to change the position of the Uyghur.46 
 
The construction of alternative ordering in the Xinjiangban 
 
Space: corridors 
Time: ten-minute break between classes 
After attending a physics class in class 15, grade one, I stepped out to the corridors to have a break. Alim and 
Diyar, two male Uyghur students, in class 15 and 16 respectively, bumped into each other in the corridor and 
offered a greeting in the standard Uyghur style: they said “Salaam” first, then put the right hand on the chest 
while bending down. Then, they shook hands and talked in Uyghur (Fieldwork notes, March 2013). 
 
In the studied school, the Uyghur students greet each other according to their ethnic custom. 
In Chen’s view, maintaining the greeting ritual in Uyghur style is one way for Uyghur 
students to maintain their ethnic identity within the boarding school.47 The break time leads 
to a temporary suspension of the teachers’ surveillance, as teachers will have a short break in 
their offices and the CCTV cameras only monitor the classrooms. The corridor, as Maryann 
Dickar notes, is a space that is naturally free from the direct control of teachers, leading to a 
“corridor culture” which subverts the authority of teachers so pervasive in the classrooms.48 
Uyghur students tactically seize the chance to transform the corridor into a space of 
negotiation, greeting each other in Uyghur style. In doing so, Uyghur students reinforce 
communal solidarity and re-assert the distinction between Uyghur and non-Uyghur. A male 
Uyghur student in grade one explained the greeting rituals: 
 
When we encounter each other in the corridor at break time or in the dinner hall in meal time, I greet my 
Uyghur brothers in a standard Uyghur style. If they sit together in the canteen, I will greet to them one by one. 
It is a way to remember that we are Uyghur; we are Muslims.49  
 
In addition to the greeting rituals, using their own language is another way in which minority 
students can reclaim their ethnic identities. Chen indicates that the Uyghur language is a kind 
of bonding social capital which represents ethnic norms and sanctions.50 In the working plan 
of the Xinjiangban at the studied school, Han Chinese has been defined as the only 
legitimized language in the school. However, since oral transmission is the most pervasive 
and covert form of everyday resistance, it is difficult for the teachers to enforce this policy 
fully.51 Jiesur, a male Uyghur in grade one, expressed his worries and explained his insistence 
on using his own language: 
 
I insist on the idea that we need to speak our own ethnic languages. I think Uyghurs should use Uyghur 
language when we chat with each other. Now, if a Uyghur speaks Chinese with me, I will warn him, “if you 
don’t speak in Uyghur, please don’t talk to me.”52  
 
Space: dormitory 
Time: 11:00 p.m. (half an hour after the rest bell) 
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Today, a female Uyghur girl told me about her tactics to maintain her Muslim identity. She said that her 
roommates are all Muslims and they have found out the regular pattern of the dorm supervisor’s patrols and 
checks. After 11:00 p.m., it is the “safe time” for them. A girl will act as a “guard” to make sure that there is no 
surveillance. Then, they will take the headscarf out from the bottom of the pillow and wear it (Fieldwork notes, 
December 2012). 
 
Although Xinjiangban students come from different ethnic groups, the vast majority of them 
are Muslims. In response to the dominant spaces of prescription, Muslim identity has been re-
asserted across ethnic groups. The fieldwork notes quoted above record one of the “post-11 
p.m. stories” observed by the researcher. There is no regular surveillance of students between 
11 p.m. and 6 a.m. This provides the Muslim students with the opportunity to accomplish 
what they call their “unfinished homework” – donning their headscarves, praying, reading the 
Qur’an, etc. In other words, Muslim students reclaim their Muslim identity under the cover of 
night. Since public presentations of ethnicity and Islamic identity are prohibited, Muslim 
students tactically respond to the dominant prescriptions by creating their own spatial–
temporal punctuations, evading the regular surveillance of the teachers and building up a 
“counter-surveillance system” in the dormitory. Irm, a male Uyghur in grade one, recounted 
his own experiences: 
 
When the lights are turned off, I hide myself under the quilt. Staying inside the quilt gives me a sense of 
being pure and sacred. In this private space, I recite the Qur’an in whispers. Only after finishing this 
work can I sleep feeling relaxed … A Uyghur roommate will be the guard who keeps an eye out for the 
teachers. When the counter-surveillance is on, my Muslim roommates and I will talk about our confusion 
about why the school wants to suppress our ethnicity and how can we respond to them.53 
 
Furthermore, the shared Muslim identity of Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Hui 
students encourage mutual monitoring with regard to religious disciplines. For example, a 
female Kazakh informant in Grade Two commented that “wearing sexy clothes is a taboo for 
our Muslim women. Although the climate is hot here (Southern China), if a Muslim girl 
wears a very short shirt or skirt, other girls will gently remind her not to do this.”54 Likewise, 
a male Kyrgyz informant in grade three remarked, “we Muslims would do specific gestures 
to thank Allah for the meal. Sometimes, some Muslim students forget to do that. Other 
Muslims would remind him of the ritual.”55 In fact, when they have meals, Muslim students 
sit in peripheral areas to avoid being monitored by the teachers. As one Uyghur student put it, 
“although doing the ethnic greeting and praying after the meal will be warned against or even 
punished by teachers, I will continue to do it in more covert ways, because it gives me a 
feeling of spiritual purity.”56 In sum, ethnic minority students exploit the moments when they 
are not under surveillance to keep alive their ethnic and religious practices. Accordingly, 
spaces of negotiation are embedded in fluid and improvised time–space settings – wearing 
headscarves in the middle of the night, reading the Qur’an under the quilt, monitoring each 
other for correct religious conduct, physical gestures, and so forth.  
 
Reinforcing resistant consciousness in cyberspace 
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[Figure 1: Portrayals of Muslim Identity in Cyberspace 
 
Notes: 
 Figures shown above are not real images of the informants. 
 
In addition to material spaces, we also interrogate the effects of virtual space and 
communication technologies on students’ negotiation practices. The widespread use of 
mobile phones poses a challenge for the teachers. On the one hand, as the principal 
mentioned, “although the Ministry of State Security monitors Muslim students’ expressions 
on the internet, the available technology still cannot locate specific expressions precisely on 
specific individuals. So, students can access and transmit improper information in anonymous 
forms.”57 On the other hand, since students use mobile phones to connect with their families, 
the school is reluctant to impose a strict management of mobile phone usage to avoid creating 
discontent among the students. Consequently, smart phones represent spaces of 
“transgression” in which students can connect with the Muslim world and transcend the 
physical confinement of the campus. Some students showed us the apps on their smart 
phones which allow them to read the Qur’an online and to access social media such as Weibo 
and QQ Zone. Such social media allow them to store articles and pictures closely related to 
ethnic cultures and Islamism (see Figure 1). The fast-growing usage of smart phones and 
their falling prices make it easier for Uyghur students to construct a space of negotiation in 
cyberspace. For example, Abu is a Uyghur student who took a part-time job in Xinjiang 
during the summer holidays in order to earn enough money for a smart phone costing 1,000 
yuan (US$163). The first thing he did once he had bought the phone was to download the full 
text of Qur’an. Adli also told us that his “dream” was to buy an Apple iPhone 5, because he 
also wanted to use a smart phone to access websites in Uyghur, like his Uyghur classmates. 
Additionally, students are eager to search for up-to-date information on Mecca, Turkey and 
other Muslim regions, an act that strengthens their cultural pride. Abu claimed that every 
Sunday, when the teachers relax monitoring, he uses his phone to read news from the Arab 
world, and this helps to purify his mind and reinforce his will power. As Lily Kong argues, 
technological developments have opened new spaces of religious practices, refiguring the 
intersection of domination and resistance.58 Such technological developments have created 




In contrast to previous studies that commonly reified a Uyghur–Han dichotomy, this paper 
borrows a spatialized framework to probe into the cultural politics of a Xinjiangban. Our 
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observation finds that prescriptions are encoded in the spatial–temporal arrangements of 
everyday schooling by policy implementers so as to persuade ethnic minority students to act 
in ways that are aligned with state agenda of cultural governance. Ethnic minority students’ 
aspirations to gain upward social mobility and the political economic logic of the policy 
warrant explanations for the tendency of students to comply quiescently with the 
prescriptions of patriotic education and ethnic integration. Interestingly, both Xinjiang 
students and local Han students are active in building some sort of mutual understanding and 
social cohesiveness. Nonetheless, Xinjiangban students do resist prescriptions in innovative, 
improvisational and contingent ways. Minority students actively use space–time tactics to 
keep alive and indeed strengthen their ethnic and religious affiliations. In the everyday 
practices through which the ongoing interplays between spaces of prescription and 
negotiation occur, this paper has demonstrated that the boundary between spaces of 
prescription and negotiation is fluid. Moreover, a focus on the spatial setting of the 
Xinjiangban enables us to delineate a clearer contour of the situated dynamics of this policy 
regime.  
Our analysis shows that although the Chinese government has assumed that the 
graduates of the Xinjiangban will eventually develop into a group of docile ethnic elites who 
uphold and promote ethnic integration and modern development in Xinjiang, the ways in 
which Xinjiangban students bring into life the spaces of negotiation seem to imply that 
Xinjiangban are far from automatons who passively act out the dominant goals of the policy. 
This paper argues that although the Xinjiangban does provide some ethnic minority students 
with better educational opportunities, which may translate into competitiveness in 
mainstream Chinese society, economic and ethnic-cultural logics are far from mutually 
exclusive. In fact, the Xinjiangban students’ ethnic identities are very much alive and tangible 
in their everyday routines and practices.  
In this sense, if the implementers of the Xinjiangban policy continue to think that 
students’ ethnic identities are at odds with integration or even national security, and if they 
enforce measures to silence ethnic expressions, it may be reasonable to foresee the 
intensification of ethnic tension, rather than its alleviation. However, it is worth noting that 
although the policy may fail to dilute students’ ethnic expressions, mutual interaction 
between local Han students and ethnic minority students has indeed been substantially 
enhanced. We suggest, albeit in a necessarily tentative gesture, that to teach Han students to 
be multiculturally sensitive and responsive is equally important and potentially rewarding. 
Given that daily encounters and interactions reduce the likelihood of hostility between local 
Han students and ethnic minority students, evidenced by the current study at the very least, it 
may be postulated that an unintended side product of the Xinjiangban policy is the cultivation 
of Han students who are at least willing to enter into multi-ethnic/multicultural interactions. 
This may entail positive implications for building and deepening ethnic rapport in current 
China in the long term. 
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